Renewable energy
Energy transition
Gas
5 min read
A decade on, have we learnt the lessons from South Australia’s ‘system black’?
Written by
Gary Bryant
Gary Bryant
Published on
02 October 2026
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28 September 2016 was a significant date in Australia’s energy system. 

That Wednesday, around 850,000 South Australian electricity customers lost power in one of the most significant ‘system black’ events in Australian history.1 A powerful storm damaged three major transmission lines and destroyed more than 20 transmission towers.2 The resulting voltage disturbances caused several wind farms to disconnect and the electricity system to collapse.3

The outage was estimated to have cost $367 million.4

A decade later, the lesson is not that Australia should slow the shift to renewables. It’s that a changing electricity system needs a safety net. Firm, dispatchable capacity is essential for when the system is under pressure.
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A transition that still needs a safety net

South Australia has since become a world leader in renewable energy. Renewables supplied almost 80 per cent of the state’s electricity in 2025.5 At times, solar, wind and batteries produce more electricity than the state consumes.

However, considering renewable generation in isolation does not paint a complete picture.

South Australia closed its last coal-fired power station in 2016. Since then, periods of low renewable generation have been managed through a combination of local batteries and gas-powered generation along with imports from Victoria through the Heywood Interconnector. A significant portion of this imported energy is generated from Victoria’s coal-fired power stations.

Batteries have a critical role in integrating renewables, responding rapidly and reducing the risk of load shedding. The Tesla big battery, brought online in December 2017, was an important addition. Yet, while batteries are excellent at managing short-term interruptions in our energy system and providing short-term storage solutions, they can’t deliver the long duration energy storage required when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow for extended periods.

The need for a safety net beyond batteries was demonstrated again during a multi-day wind drought, or ‘dunkelflaute’, in South Australia in June this year. 

As captured in the chart below, as renewables fell away, the state’s grid-scale batteries stepped up, but were discharged within hours and had nothing left to give. It was gas-powered generation that stepped in, complemented with solar when available, for the following four days, doing the heavy lifting to fill the gap and keep the lights on.

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Source: Open Electricity (formerly OpenNEM). South Australia (SA1) electricity data, detailed fuel-technology series, June 2026. Underlying sources: AEMO, Australian PV Institute (APVI) and Bureau of Meteorology (BoM).

The system needs more than energy 

In addition to providing this much needed energy, gas-powered generation is also an important source of system security. Synchronous rotating generation provides essential electrical services including inertia, voltage support, system strength and fault current. These services are not easily replaced by batteries or inverter-based technologies.

Voltage issues were a feature of the April 2025 ‘system black’ across Spain and Portugal, the most severe European blackout in more than 20 years.6 The circumstances were different, but the reminder was the same: system security cannot be taken for granted.

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South Australia is building a safety net

Ten years after the blackout, South Australia is putting the final touches on the policy designed to deliver secure long-duration, dispatchable electricity capacity - the Firm Energy Reliability Mechanism, or FERM.

The FERM is intended to ensure South Australia has long-duration capacity available to run for days or weeks during extended periods of low wind and solar generation, the safety net South Australia needs as it transitions toward its goal of 100% renewable energy. 

In practice, much of that insurance is likely to be provided by gas-powered generation.

That is the purpose of a reliability mechanism: not to run firming generation all the time, but to make sure it is there when the system needs it most.

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Delivering a safety net across the National Electricity Market

The rest of the National Electricity Market (NEM) is now moving in the same direction. 

The proposed Electricity Services Entry Mechanism, or ESEM, should help bring forward the firming capacity the NEM will need. But important design details are still being finalised, and delay carries a cost and risk.

Transmission and renewable generation projects are already taking longer to build. If replacement generation and firming capacity does not arrive in time, state governments will face growing pressure to further extend the lives of ageing coal-fired power stations.

That would increase the risk of missing Australia’s emissions-reduction targets. It would also leave the system more exposed to unexpected generation and transmission outages.

Gas-powered generation can provide the long-duration, dispatchable safety net a renewables-led electricity system needs. It can start quickly when required, is highly flexible, supports essential system services and sits ready through the periods when wind, solar, batteries and interconnectors cannot carry the full load.

The lesson from 28 September 2016 is clear: ambition must be matched by pragmatism and planning. Industry is ready to invest in the safety net needed to provide resilience, so long as the right policy settings are in place.

Australia must get on with delivering the infrastructure needed for reliability and resilience before the lights go out, not after.

1  AEMC Issues and Approach Paper, Review of the System Black Event in South Australia, 2019, page 1. 
2  ABC, SA's statewide blackout was five years ago — here's how energy supply has evolved since then, 2021
3  AER, The Black System Event Compliance Report, 2018, page 13.
4  AEMC Issues and Approach Paper, Review of the System Black Event in South Australia, 2019, page 1.
5  Energy.gov.au, Australian electricity generation - fuel mix calendar year 2025, Australian electricity generation - fuel mix calendar year 2025 | energy.gov.au
6  ICS Investigation Expert Panel Final Report: Grid Incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025, 2026, page 1.